

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 SEOUL 06741 271240Z

53

ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 (ISO) W

----- 018665

O 270941Z AUG 76

FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9106

S E C R E T SEOUL 6741

NODIS CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PFOR, KS, KN, US

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT PARK

REF: (A) STATE 212396, (B) STATE 212739, (C) STATE 212554,
(D) STATE 212740

SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR MET WITH PRESIDENT PARK AUG. 27 P.M. TO PROVIDE INFORMATION IN REFTELS, ON CONVERSATION WITH PRC AND REASON FOR NOT DELAYING MAC MEETING. PARK PRESSED VERY HARD FOR U.S. COMMITMENT NOW TO FURTHER ACTIONS WHEN, AS HE EXPECTS, NORTH KOREANS REJECT OUR MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS. PARK IN COURSE OF CONVERSATION WAS MORE CRITICAL THAN IN PAST OF U.S. POSTURE IN RESPONSE TO AUGUST 18 INCIDENT. END SUMMARY.

1. I MET AUGUST 27 WITH PRESIDENT PARK TO BRIEF HIM ON INFORMATION IN REFS A, B AND C REGARDING SECRETARY'S CONVERSATION WITH PRC LO HAUNG CHEN AND OUR REASONS FOR NOT DELAYING CALL FOR MAC MEETING. PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARY GEN. KIM CHUNG YUM AND INTERPRETER CHOI KWANG SOO WERE AS USUAL PRESENT BUT ALL RECOGNIZED NEED FOR MAINTAINED CLOSELY CONFIDENTIALITY INFORMATION PROVIDED. AFTER PRESENTING INFORMATION IN REFS A, B AND C, I ALSO POINTED OUT THAT IN VERY QUICK RESPONSE TO PARK'S SUGGESTION WE HAD INCLUDED REITERATION FOR CALL FOR PUNISHMENT.

2. AFTER DIGESTING THIS INFORMATION, PARK IMMEDIATELY PRESSED ME FOR ANSWER TO QUESTION WHICH HE SAID IS UPPERMOST IN HIS MIND, NAMELY WHAT ACTIONS U.S. CONTEMPLATES IF NORTH KOREANS DO NOT
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SEOUL 06741 271240Z

MEET OUR MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS SO THAT WE MIGHT CLOSE OUT AUG. 18

INCIDENT PROPERLY. HE DOES NOT EXPECT NORTH KOREANS TO MEET OUR MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS AND WENT SO FAR AS SAYING LATER IN MEETING THEY WOULD NOT EVEN AGREE TO FULL MAC MEETING ON BASIS THEIR FIRST RESPONSE AUGUST 27TH FOR SECRETARY'S MEETING (THIS LATTER PRE- DICTION OF COURSE PROVED NOT TO BE CASE). PARK SAID THAT WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN CLEAR FROM THE BEGINNING AND CERTAINLY NOW HAVE IN MIND WHAT MEASURES WE INTEND TO TAKE TO CONTINUE PRESSURE ON NORTH KOREANS. HE WENT ON TO STATE THAT NORTH KOREANS PROBABLY SENSE ALREADY U.S. PRESSURE WILL SUBSIDE AND ARE THEREFORE LIKELY

TO STALL AS INDICATED BY THEIR REFUSAL TO HAVE MAC MEETING. HE CITED IN THIS CONNECTION, DOMESTIC U.S. PRESSURES TO CALL OFF ALERT MENTIONED TO HIM (REF C).

3. IN MY INITIAL RESPONSE, I POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS TOO EARLY TO PREDICT WHAT NORTH KOREANS MIGHT DO IN RESPECT TO OUR MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS OR HOLDING OF MAC MEETING OR HOW WE WOULD RESPOND. I SAID THAT I WAS NOT INFORMED AS TO WHAT MEASURES WASHINGTON MIGHT HAVE IN MIND IF THE NORTH KOREANS REJECTED OUR REQUIREMENTS. HOWEVER, AS WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY REITERATED TO PRESIDENT PARK INCLUDING YESTERDAY, WE INTEND TO MAINTAIN A FIRM PRESSURE AND WILL KEEP OUR ADDITIONAL DEPLOYMENTS IN AND AROUND KOREA UNTIL WE REACH SATISFACTORY OUTCOME AT PANMUNJOM. FURTHERMORE, WE WILL CONTINUE TO CONSULT WITH HIM AS IN THE PAST ON ANY FUTURE ACTIONS AS WELL AS ON THE WINDING DOWN OF OUR ALERT POSTURE AND DEPLOYMENTS. PARK BRUSHED ASIDE THIS RESPONSE AND SAID HE "FEELS STRONGLY" THAT WE SHOULD HAVE ALREADY CONTEMPLATED MEASURES IF AS EXPECTED THE NORTH KOREANS REBUFFED US. HE SAID THAT FROM THE BEGINNING HE HAS BEEN CONCERNED ABOUT OUR WHOLE APPROACH TO THE INCIDENT. WE SHOULD HAVE FROM THE START SET OUR MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS AND THEN BUILT UP OUR MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC PRESSURES, ONLY IN THE LAST MOMENT STATING THAT WE WERE SATISFIED. INSTEAD, WE HAVE MADE CONCESSION AFTER CONCESSION WITHOUT SETTING FORTH OUR MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS. RATHER THAN FORCING NORTH KOREA INTO A CORNER, WE REVERSED OUR PUBLIC POSITION ON MONDAY AND SAID THAT THE NORTH KOREAN RESPONSE WAS A "POSITIVE STEP". EVEN IF WE FELT THIS TRUE WE SHOULD NOT HAVE SAID SO PUBLICLY. FURTHERMORE THERE ARE REPORTS, FROM DOD SOURCES, WHICH CERTAINLY WILL COME TO ATTENTION OF NORTH KOREA, THAT WE PLAN TO CONTINUE OUR PRESENT ALERT POSTURE ONLY UNTIL THE END OF THIS WEEK.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 SEOUL 06741 271240Z

4. I RESPONDED QUITE FIRMLY THAT THIS CRITICISM OF OUR ACTIONS IS DISAPPOINTING AND WAS NOT WARRANTED BY THE FACTS IN THE SITUATION. I POINTED OUT AGAIN THAT WE HAD MAINTAINED OUR FIRM POSTURE AND DEPLOYMENT IN AND AROUND KOREA. ALSO WE HAD UNDERTAKEN TREE CUTTING WITH ATTENDENT RISKS. THE NORTH KOREANS AND NOT WE HAD MADE THE CONCESSIONS AND THERE WAS NO TRUTH IN DOD REPORT HE CITED AS HE KNEW. I WENT ON TO POINT OUT THAT IN RESPECT TO MINIMUM

REQUIREMENTS THAT WE HAD ALREADY RECEIVED AN EXPRESSION OF REGRETS, THAT WE ARE PRESSING FOR ASSURANCES ON THE SAFETY OF OUR FORCES AND THAT, WITH RESPECT TO PUNISHMENT, EVEN PARK HAD ACKNOWLEDGED UNLIKELIHOOD OF POSITIVE RESPONSE BUT PRESSED TO KEEP DEMAND AS BARGAINING POINT --AS WE HAVE AGREED TO DO. I STRESSED THAT OUR POSITION AND OUR ACTIONS HAD IN FACT BEEN WORKED OUT IN FULL CONSULTATION WITH ROKG AND WERE IN RESPONSE TO THEIR SUGGESTIONS THROUGHOUT POST-INCIDENT PERIOD. I ALSO REBUTED HIS CONTENTION THAT STATE DEPT. STATEMENT OF MONDAY WAS "REVERSAL" OF SUNDAY'S STATEMENT. I AGAIN URGED WE WAIT FOR NORTH KOREAN RESPONSE BEFORE COMING TO JUDGMENT AND ASKED HIM WHAT OTHER MEASURES HE HAD IN MIND.

5. PARK SNAPPED BACK THAT WE MUST EXPECT NORTH KOREANS NOT TO MEET OUR MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS BUT WE ARE IN POSITION WHERE WE HAVE NOTHING PLANNED TO KEEP UP THE PRESSURE ON THEM. NORTH KOREANS THEREFORE WILL SAFELY ASSUME THEY CAN RESIST US AND COMMIT ANY ACT OF PROVOCATION WITHOUT A PROPER U.S. RESPONSE. AS TO SPECIFIC MEASURES WHILE HE STILL URGED AGAINST TAKING MILITARY ACTIONS WHICH WILL ENLARGE THE SITUATION, HE SUGGESTED BLOCKADING SEVERAL NORTH KOREAN PORTS. HE ALSO THOUGHT THAT THE BUILDUP OF U.S. FORCES WAS IN FACT NOT NECESSARY TO EXERT PRESSURES ON KIM IL SUNG, A POINT I CONTENDED. I ALSO COMMENTED THAT A BLOCKADE COULD IN FACT CONSTITUTE AN ACT OF WAR.

6. IN EFFORT TO CLOSE OFF CONVERSATION I URGED AGAIN BOTH GOVERNMENTS AWAIT RESULTS OF CURRENT DISCUSSIONS WITH NORTH KOREANS AT MAC BEFORE COMING TO FURTHER JUDGMENTS. WHEN WE GET NORTH KOREAN RESPONSE WE CAN THEN CONSULT. I FURTHER POINTED OUT THAT IN DEFINING MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS, WHICH PARK WAS VERY VAGUE ON, WE USE SPECIFIC DEMANDS MADE IN MAC MEETING WHICH WE HAD GONE OVER WITH ROKG VERY CAREFULLY.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 SEOUL 06741 271240Z

7. PARK THEN SAID HE WISHED OFFICIALLY TO REQUEST WASHINGTON RESPONSE TO HIS QUESTION: WHAT FURTHER ACTIONS DO WE NOW CONTEMPLATE TO PRESSURE NORTH KOREA WHEN NORTH KOREANS TURN US DOWN AND REFUSE TO MEET OUR MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS OR WILL WE BACK DOWN? HE ENDED CONVERSATION BY ASKING HOW U.S. PUBLIC HAD RESPONDED TO OUR STAND INCLUDING NOT INSISTING ON PUNISHMENT FOR THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR MURDER OF TWO OFFICERS. I POINTED OUT TO PARK THAT ADMINISTRATION HAD RECEIVED WIDE-SPREAD SUPPORT FROM LEADING POLITICAL FIGURES, INCLUDING PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE CARTER AND SENATOR KENNEDY, AS WELL AS VIRTUALLY ALL U.S. NEWSPAPERS. THIS SUPPORT FOR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION HAD ALSO EMBRACED BROAD SUPPORT FOR U.S. COMMITMENT TO KOREA AND STATIONING OF U.S. FORCES HERE OVER LONGER TERM, A REAL GAIN FOR ROK. AT SAME TIME, MANY COMMENTS HAD URGED A MEASURE OF RESTRAINT IN RESPONSE TO NORTH KOREAN ACTION.

COMMENT: AS CAN BE NOTED FROM ABOVE, PRESIDENT PARK CLEARLY WANTS TO KEEP OUR FEET TO THE FIRE AND NOT LET US GET OFF THE HOOK EASILY, AN UNDERSTANDABLE REACTION GIVEN CONSTANT NORTH KOREAN PRESSURES ON ROK. AS HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY EVIDENT, HE WOULD LIKE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF AUGUST 18 INCIDENT TO DEAL SUFFICIENTLY TOUGH BLOW TO NORTH KOREANS TO SERVE AS DETERRENT AGAINST FURTHER PROVOCATION OF ANY SORT OVER LONG SPAN OF TIME. MY IMPRESSION IS THAT HIS MOOD OF BELLIGERANCE AND FRUSTRATION, TODAY WITH CLEAR-CUT EMOTIONAL OVERTONES, HAS INCREASED AS PROSPECTS FOR POSSIBLE AGREEMENT WITH NORTH KOREA IN CLOSING OUT INCIDENT HAVE IMPROVED. WHILE I OF COURSE AGREED TO PASS HIS QUESTION BACK TO WASHINGTON, I GAVE HIM NO GROUNDS FOR HOPE THAT WE WOULD UNDERTAKE UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES FURTHER MEASURES, SUCH AS NAVAL BLOCKADE, BUT DID INTEND TO MAINTAIN OUR CONTINUED FIRM POSTURE UNTIL WE RECEIVED ADEQUATE ASSURANCES ON THE SAFETY OF OUR PERSONNEL AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AS INSISTED UPON AT MAC MEETING.

RECOMMENDATION: I WOULD URGE INSTRUCTIONS IN RESPONSE TO PARK LETTER ALONG LINES PREVIOUSLY RECOMMENDED (SEOUL 6666), WITH ADDITION OF FIRM BUT MEASURED REJECTION OF HIS PRESSURE FOR NEW MILITARY MEASURES UNLESS OF COURSE SITUATION WARRANTS SUCH ACTIONS.
SNEIDER

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 05 SEOUL 06741 271240Z

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, MILITARY BUILDUP, MEETING REPORTS, GOVERNMENT REACTIONS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, BORDER INCIDENTS, SHOW OF FORCE, POPULAR SUPP ORT, CAT-B, CHEROKEE 08/27/76
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 27 AUG 1976
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: izenbei0
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976SEOUL06741
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Film Number: P840109-2694, N760006-0500
From: SEOUL
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760812/aaaaajtc.tel
Line Count: 201
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Reference: 76 STATE 212396, 76 STATE 212739, 76 STATE 212554, 76 STATE 212740
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: izenbei0
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 01 JUN 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <01 JUN 2004 by ElyME>; APPROVED <27 SEP 2004 by izenbei0>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT PARK
TAGS: PFOR, MARR, US, KS, KN, (PARK CHUNG-HEE)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006